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1 Multi-sided Platforms and the Chicken-and-Egg
Dilemma
Today, digital platforms mediating between independent
groups of users account for a total market value of about
US-$4.3 trillion and an employment base of several million
direct and indirect employees (Evans and Gawer 2016). A
multi-sided platform (MSP) – in the literature also referred
to as two-sided platform, two-sided market, or multi-sided
market – constitutes a market that enables interaction
between at least two sets of users through an intermediary,
where the decisions of each group of users on either side of
the market affects the outcomes of the users on the other
side(s) (Rochet and Tirole 2004; Rysman 2009; Hagiu and
Wright 2015). MSPs have impressively demonstrated their
disruptive potential in well-established global industries.
Airbnb, for instance, leads the CNBC disruptor 50 list
(CNBC 2017) and, with a market valuation of US-
$31 billion, comes second after the Marriott group in the
lodging industry (Bensinger 2017). Its two-sided platform
mediates between traveling people who seek accommoda-
tion and hosts willing to share their accommodation. The
exponential growth of its platform started around 2011,
when the critical inflection point (in respect of the number
of users) was reached and network effects started to kick in
(Hagiu and Rothman 2016). As the first in its industry,
Airbnb has been able to solve one of the critical early-stage
challenges of MSPs, namely the mutual baiting problem,
which often is referred to as the ‘chicken-and-egg
dilemma’ of multi-sided digital platforms.
MSPs have been a popular research topic for scholars in
the fields of economics, strategic management, and, more
recently, as a consequence of the emergence of large-scale
web-based platforms, to information systems scholars. Two
major streams of research on MSPs can be distinguished.
The first stream examines pricing and commission choices
(Armstrong 2006; Chao and Derdenger 2013; Dou et al.
2016; Eisenmann et al. 2006; Parker and Van Alstyne
2005; Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006; Rysman 2009), while
the second stream investigates choices with regard to
platform design and investments, such as the quality of
technology and rules of interaction (Bakos and Katsamakas
2008), the effects of advertisement (Tucker and Zhang
2010) and ownership model (Yoo et al. 2002), business
model design (Hagiu and Wright 2015), value-added ser-
vices (Anderson et al. 2014), competition among platforms
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(Caillaud and Jullien 2003), platform openness (Rysman
2009), and revenue optimization (Voigt and Hinz 2015).
In most of the above works, economic theories of net-
work externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Liebowitz and
Margolis 1994; Rochet and Tirole 2004) play a significant
role. On MSPs, network effects can emerge on one side of
the platform (i.e., same-side network effects) and across
sides (i.e., cross-side network effects; see Voigt and Hinz
2015). The latter give rise to the chicken-and-egg dilemma
of early-stage MSPs. This dilemma describes the need for a
critical number of sellers (or volume of supply) to attract
buyers (or demand); however, sellers will only adopt the
platform and invest if they expect a sufficient number of
buyers on the other side to join (Armstrong 2006; Caillaud
and Jullien 2003; Eisenmann et al. 2006). Once MSPs
reach the critical user mass on each side of the platform,
the effects of network externalities turn positive and
stimulate platform growth (Hagiu and Rothman 2016). The
utilization of positive network externalities beyond the
critical inflection point has been a popular research topic.
We refer to Chu and Manchanda (2016) for a state-of-the-
art overview of the relevance of cross-side network effects
on the evolution of large-scale online consumer-to-con-
sumer platforms.
Although research on cross-side network effects has
been dominated by formal economic models, some
empirical studies have also elaborated on the presence and
magnitude of cross-side network effects. General empirical
evidence for the existence of significant cross-side network
effects has been verified, for instance, in the market for
yellow pages (Rysman 2004), in the television-advertising
industry (Wilbur 2008), and in the personal computer
industry (Stremersch et al. 2007). Ackerberg and Gow-
risankaran (2006) estimated the size and importance of
cross-side network effects in the banking industry and
found that in the case of high adoption costs for potential
users, MSPs need to offer appropriate incentives to ensure
that they reach the critical user mass. Moreover, Chu and
Manchanda (2016) quantified cross-side network effects
and concluded that they are asymmetrical, as the growth of
buyers (platform demand) benefits more from a large base
of sellers (platform supply) than vice versa.
In the following, typical platform launch strategies –
also referred to as platform seeding strategies, platform
scaling, platform scaling-up strategies – able to tackle the
underlying chicken-and-egg dilemma for early-stage MSPs
are presented. While it might be possible for some plat-
forms to apply any of these launch strategies or to even
combine several strategies, this will not be the case for all
platforms.
2 Platform Launch Strategies for Solving the Chicken-
and-Egg Dilemma
The following discussion of launch strategies for solving
the chicken-and-egg dilemma builds on academic literature
in economics, management and information systems, as
well as practitioner-oriented publications on the web that
primarily address the high-tech startup community. We
aggregate and structure the identified strategic patterns into
six distinct strategies, namely focusing on (1) a single
target group, (2) platform staging, (3) subsidizing, (4)
platform envelopment, (5) exclusivity agreements, and (6)
side switching. These strategies specifically address the
chicken-and-egg dilemma of early-stage MSPs and may be
applied individually or in combination.
To illustrate the application of these strategies, we refer
to examples from the crowdworking industry. Crowd-
working, also referred to as microworking, is a form of
online outsourcing with several hundreds of active medi-
ating workplace platforms. Kuek et al. (2015) defined it as
an approach to breaking down projects and tasks into
microtasks that can be completed in seconds or in a few
minutes. Microtasks, such as image tagging, text tran-
scription, or data entry, usually require basic numeracy and
literacy skills. Microworkers are typically paid small
amounts of money for completing microtasks. The
crowdworking industry constitutes a particularly interest-
ing field of application for the strategies discussed in our
paper. On the one hand, this industry shows relatively
consolidated structures for web-based platforms, with
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and CrowdFlower
representing about 80% of the global web market (Kuek
et al. 2015). On the other hand, however, new crowd-
working industry segments are currently emerging enabled
by technological innovations such as mobile crowdworking
via smartphones, or crowdworking via augmented reality
and virtual reality. Correspondingly, a wide range of star-
tups and established businesses have entered these
emerging industry segments with platform concepts that
may stimulate research and the overall understanding of
MSPs.
2.1 Single Target Group
Focusing on one particular target group or market segment
is a well-known strategy (cf., e.g., Porter 1980). To this
end, MSPs may start, for example, with a single city or
industry. By reducing the total market size and the required
critical user mass, MSPs require fewer resources and less
time to reach the critical inflection point from which the
MSP can grow to other market segments. When initially
focusing on a single market segment, MSPs can achieve
higher levels of differentiation and platform performance
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in this market segment, which increases expectations
among potential platform users that everyone else will
adopt the same platform in future (Cennamo and Santalo
2013). Uber initially limited its operations to San Francisco
and once it was successful in this city, the management
decided to expand its business to other locations.
There are at least two variations of this strategy.
• Marquee users: An MSP focusing on marquee users
initially acquires users whose participation brings
extraordinary value for other platform users, thereby
potentially attracting a higher number of new users
(Eisenmann et al. 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2003).
Among other attributes, marquee users can be opinion
leaders, bring high-quality transactions to the MSP
(Binken and Stremersch 2009; Landsman and Stremer-
sch 2011), or serve as very active users (Wilson et al.
2009).
• Loyal users: The second variation of this strategy
results from focusing on loyal users. These may be
captive on a platform for various reasons, such as lower
price sensitivity (Rochet and Tirole 2003), higher sunk
costs (Evans 2003), or positive expectations for plat-
form development (Zhu and Iansiti 2012). Loyal users
tend to display a lower willingness to churn (i.e.
discontinue platform usage) and thus allow MSPs to
reach the required user mass with lower financial
resources. Moreover, a substantial share of loyal users
often involve a lower price elasticity, thus providing
more opportunities for the MSP to capitalize on
transactions (Rysman 2009).
In the crowdworking industry, marquee users can be
suppliers of attractive or well-paid tasks on the supply side,
in turn attracting many workers on the demand side. The
execution of a loyal user strategy, in contrast, may include
designing an MSP that is primarily or solely used through
an application programming interface (API), as this causes
higher adoption costs (i.e. sunk costs) in the form of pro-
gramming and adjustment of business processes compared
to adoption via a standardized web interface. Over time,
once a company continues to adjust its business processes
toward the platform, switching costs may increase as a
result. Another measure available to crowdworking plat-
forms is to set up a reputation regime for the amount and
quality of work or tasks provided, which is particularly
valuable for receiving tasks or finding good workers
(Fiverr and MTurk may serve as examples). Such a regime
seeks to retain loyal users by increasing switching costs to
another platform, since a user would lose her profile his-
tory and has to rebuild her reputation from scratch. A third
method for increasing social binding and commitment to a
platform would be to adopt a by-invitation-only platform.
2.2 Platform Staging
With the platform-staging strategy, an MSP evolves in two
distinct steps from a traditional vendor-based business
model in the first stage to a platform mediation business
model in the second stage after reaching the critical user
mass (Hagiu and Eisenmann 2007; Hagiu and Wright
2015). This strategy can help MSPs to focus on one market
side at a time, thereby avoiding negative indirect network
effects in the early development stage. Amazon, for
instance, initially launched its crowdworking platform
MTurk as a service for its own purposes (Menezes 2013).
By providing the supply side completely independently
(first-party content), Amazon had the opportunity to focus
on building the demand side of workers (Hagiu and Spul-
ber 2013). In a second stage, after reaching a considerable
worker base, Amazon started to open its platform to other
companies with similar needs and evolved MTurk to a
platform mediating between two groups of users. This
strategy can also be applied by MSPs without an inde-
pendent source of supply by contracting third-party sup-
pliers with a traditional vendor business model in the first
stage. A variation of the staging strategy aims at starting as
a single-sided platform. The OpenTable restaurant reser-
vation service, for example, distributed booking manage-
ment systems in the first stage, which restaurants then used
as a standalone application to manage table bookings. Once
they had enough restaurants on board, and hence access to
their seating inventory, they opened the demand side and
collected a commission from the restaurants for every
referred customer. When executing a staging strategy, the
platform design should be geared toward the final MSP
architecture from the outset (Eisenmann et al. 2008),
although a traditional business model may be applied in the
first stage.
Platform-staging strategies are of particular interest for
the supply side of crowdworking platforms. In this regard,
Amazon constitutes a rather rare example of being able to
provide sufficient first-party content independently to reach
the critical mass of workers before starting to evolve into
an MSP. Alternatively, early-stage crowdworking plat-
forms have the opportunity to act as vendors of microtask
services initially, thereby reducing the otherwise negative
cross-side network effects of a low initial worker base.
Another strategic opportunity for young crowdworking
platforms worth investigating is starting as an application
with standalone functionalities. Following the example of
OpenTable, a crowdworking platform may offer a stan-
dalone application to break down complex business
workflows into small tasks that can more easily be out-
sourced to third parties. In the second stage, the crowd-
working platform then gradually acquires users of the
standalone application as platform users on the supply side.
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As a strategic advantage, users of the standalone applica-
tions have reduced adoption costs when business processes
have already been managed in small tasks with a compat-
ible application.
2.3 Subsidizing
Subsidizing strategies play a prominent role in platform-
mediated business models; thus, they have been studied
extensively in the economic literature (Anderson et al.
2014; Rochet and Tirole 2006). Due to cross-side network
effects, subsidizing decisions on one side also affect
adoption on the other side (Armstrong 2006). Such MSPs
typically have a ‘subsidy side’ that allows the use of the
platform with discounts or even for free, and a ‘money
side’ that is charged for participation or transactions
(Eisenmann et al. 2006). Subsidizing one side of the market
to attract the ‘money side’ of the MSP until the critical
inflection point is reached is a common strategy (Eisen-
mann et al. 2011; Fath and Sarvary 2003). This can take
different forms, such as price cuts, free usage, offers of
investment incentives (Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran
2006; Hagiu 2009; Muzellec et al. 2015), offers of value-
added services (Dou et al. 2016), technical support for
development programming (Schilling 2003), and even
paying users as a means of attracting them (Evans 2003).
An MSP can therefore afford to sustain a loss on the
‘subsidy side’ as long as the loss is recovered on the
‘money side’ (Armstrong and Wright 2007). The decision
as to which side to charge and how (calculation and
charging mechanism) is complex and depends on factors
like the users’ sensitivity to price (Hagiu and Spulber 2013)
or quality (Eisenmann et al. 2006). In the context of video
game systems in the United States, Clements and Ohashi
(2005) found empirical evidence to support the view that
initial subsidizing is an effective practice.
In the crowdworking industry, workers represent the
‘subsidy side’ and usually they have fully subsidized access
to the platform. On the ‘money side’, businesses are
charged via various pricing and commission mechanisms.
In this respect, most subsidizing strategies on MSPs show
some pattern of market penetration strategy with a low
starting price, and increase their price once a user base has
been established (Cennamo and Santalo 2013; Rysman
2009).
2.4 Platform Envelopment
The platform envelopment strategy aims at leveraging the
shared relationships with (other) established platforms and
their networks (Eisenmann et al. 2006). When applying
such a strategy, an MSP strives to combine its own func-
tionalities with those of a target platform in a multi-
platform bundle that leverages shared user relationships
(Eisenmann et al. 2011). This is possible because many
industries with MSPs are neither exclusive nor do they
operate in a ‘winner takes all’ market setting (Caillaud and
Jullien 2003) which allows multiple MSPs to coexist
(Shankar and Bayus 2003). Rather than building a platform
from scratch, the platform envelopment strategy aims at
partnering with existing and potentially large platforms
with a view to growing with them (Rochet and Tirole
2003).
In addition to a substantial overlap in the user base, the
platform envelopment strategy also requires low costs for
switching or multihoming users (Armstrong 2006). Multi-
homing refers to the simultaneous usage of multiple plat-
forms for a similar purpose, such as gaming – when a user
owns multiple gaming consoles to play a wider range of
computer games – or crowdworking (Landsman and
Stremersch 2011) whereby a user may be affiliated with
more than one crowdworking platform to receive access to
a larger pool of tasks. The corresponding multihoming
costs comprise all expenses users incur, including adoption,
operation and opportunity costs (Eisenmann et al. 2006).
Many MSPs face multihoming on one or both sides
(Armstrong and Wright 2007; Evans 2003).
Another approach to executing the platform envelop-
ment strategy is automated harvesting, that is, the collec-
tion and processing of information already stored
elsewhere. MSPs can apply automated harvesting tech-
niques to seed (usually) one side of the market (Sokoler
2011). Content providers like Amazon, Google, CNET,
Facebook, and Twitter offer APIs that MSPs can use to
first acquire content and users for one side of the platform
and then seek to attract users on the other side. This may
still apply in the absence of an API or direct-feed oppor-
tunities as MSPs can use some popular techniques, such as
web scraping, to acquire both content and users.
In the crowdworking industry, multihoming is common
on the demand side. Microworkers tend to use multiple
platforms to enlarge their access to the limited number of
paid microtasks (Kuek et al. 2015). Due to low multi-
homing costs for microworkers, platform envelopment is a
viable strategy for the demand side of early-stage crowd-
working platforms. As an example, CrowdFlower applied
an envelopment strategy in its early development stage on
the demand side through publishing tasks on the much
larger MTurk microworker network. On the supply side,
multihoming is less frequent because of the costs incurred
by businesses to adopt an additional crowdworking plat-
form, especially in respect of integrating multiple plat-
forms in business processes and programming multiple
interfaces.
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2.5 Exclusivity Agreements
Signing exclusivity agreements on one market side can
attract other users on both market sides (Cennamo and
Santalo 2013). In the gaming industry, for example, MSP
providers like Sony and Microsoft mediate between game
developers and game consumers. Both contracted Elec-
tronic Arts, the dominant sports game manufacturer at that
time, in order to achieve some form of (temporary)
exclusivity for some games that are supposed to attract
both gamers and other game developers to their consoles
(Eisenmann et al. 2006; Rysman 2009; Parker et al. 2016).
Exclusivity agreements have been proven to enhance the
competitiveness of an MSP’s offering (Armstrong and
Wright 2007; Hagiu 2009). Moreover, exclusivity agree-
ments with marquee users potentially increase the overall
quality of content on an MSP, as they diminish the adverse
selection problem of attracting lower quality content
(Cennamo and Santalo 2013). Especially for early-stage
MSPs, exclusive affiliations with marquee users and
exclusive rights to high-quality content can help signaling
positive prospects for the platform and accelerate a plat-
form’s growth (Eisenmann et al. 2008).
Signing exclusivity agreements with marquee users for
the sake of attracting other users to the early-stage platform
is a less frequently applied strategy in the crowdworking
industry. However, some crowdworking platforms, such as
Fiverr, use such exclusivity agreements with all
microworkers. Correspondingly, all advertisements of ser-
vices provided by microworkers must be labeled with
‘Exclusively on Fiverr’.
2.6 Side Switching
The idea behind the side-switching strategy is to make a
two-sided platform one-sided by finding a platform design
that allows users to fill both market sides of the MSP at the
same time. Obviously, this strategy only works if services
or products of both sides do not require high set-up costs or
specific knowledge. The concept of side switching on
MSPs has already been addressed by Gaze´ and Vaubourg
(2011), but to the best of our knowledge, it has not yet been
considered in terms of its application in platform launch
strategies for solving the chicken-and-egg problem. Etsy
and Airbnb are among the most popular examples of
companies that have successfully applied this strategy in
early-stage platform development. As people who are
likely to buy handmade goods are also likely to sell them,
Etsy focused on this target group to fill both sides of its
MSP simultaneously before expanding to other target
groups that fill only one side of the market. Similarly,
Airbnb targeted private users who could both offer and
demand accommodation for travel purposes. Such a
strategy would not have worked if Airbnb had only targeted
a business-to-business (B2B) accommodation audience that
would primarily provide supply to the platform, as a suc-
cessful execution of this strategy requires MSPs to build a
user base that benefits from side switching (Gaze´ and
Vaubourg 2011). Moreover, a single-city user base for the
early-stage Airbnb platform would likely have been less
attractive for users, as they typically do not seek to rent
accommodation in the same city where they live. In con-
trast, a user base distributed over two cities with substantial
travel volume between them would be able to exploit side-
switching effects.
Side switching as a strategy may also be a viable option
for a crowdworking platform when focusing on use cases
that users can approach from both sides. Market research
for startups may be a suitable crowdworking use case for
which startup founders provide platform supply in the form
of market research tasks while potentially belonging to the
target group of market research studies from other startups
on the same platform. Another potential use case for a side-
switching strategy may be empirical research with a user
base of students that both conduct and participate in
research studies. The German market research startup Ap-
pinio applies the side-switching strategy on their platform
by encouraging participants in market research studies to
carry out their own research on its platform using the
compensation they earned from completing other users’
questionnaires. The established crowdworking platforms
Fiverr and MTurk may serve as further examples as in both
cases contributors (i.e. workers) also may take over the role
of requesters (i.e. buyers).
3 Conclusion and Outlook
Cross-side network effects on MSPs have been a popular
topic in the literature for some time. Corresponding
research has provided valuable insights into the nature and
key principles of markets that mediate products or services
between two or more groups of users. The practical rele-
vance of such work has become even greater with the
emergence of digital MSPs, which have impressively
demonstrated their potential to disrupt major industries on
a global scale within a few years. It is safe to assume that
the impact of platform businesses will increase in infor-
mation-intensive industries, industries with non-scalable
gatekeepers, highly fragmented industries as well as
industries with extreme information asymmetries, which
notably include education, health care, energy, finance,
logistics and transportation and, last but not least, labor and
professional services (Parker et al. 2016).
In all of the above sectors and probably several others as
well, we will see new MSPs struggling to solve the
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chicken-and-egg dilemma. The management of these MSPs
may apply one or a combination of the six generic platform
launch strategies that have been outlined above.
The apparent lack of empirical evidence on the effec-
tiveness of these strategies and, particularly so, on the
effectiveness of combinations of these strategies, offers a
promising direction for further research aimed at advancing
our understanding of why many early-stage MSPs fail and
others succeed. Future research in this direction should also
strive to identify universally valid success factors of MSP
activities. Given that mediating platforms may also contain
more than two sides, and that they can coexist with a tra-
ditional one-sided merchant business model in an overar-
ching selling strategy (Rysman 2009), the investigation of
these different types of platforms and the underlying
business models, respectively, constitutes a second field for
further research (see, e.g., Veit et al. 2014, for a general
research agenda on business models). Further, it could be
worthwhile to employ novel research methods. So far, most
insights are derived from case studies of successful or
failed platforms. As the number of these platforms is still
relatively small and the characteristics of the market they
have been situated in is quite diverse, cumulative learning
is limited. Quantitative modeling and simulating the
establishment of a platform that employs some launching
strategy (or a combination of several launching strategies)
therefore seems to be a particularly promising approach
(for an overview of such market simulations from inno-
vation diffusion research see Kiesling et al. 2012). As a
useful by-product, the aforesaid modeling and simulation
approaches might contribute to ‘‘novel theorizing on digital
innovation management’’ which promises to become ‘‘a
rich and potentially highly rewarding area of research for
information systems researchers’’ (Nambisan et al. 2017).
Another fruitful avenue of research concerns the interre-
lation between platform launch strategies and the enterprise
architecture of the platform in general, and technology
pivots in particular. Once a launch strategy turns out to be
successful this often goes along not only with adaptations
in the business architecture (e.g., price setting) but also in
the application and infrastructure architecture. Hence, there
is a need to adapt to this growth at some point in time with
a so-called technology pivot (Ries 2011). Failing to pivot at
the right time (and for the right reasons) can substantially
jeopardize the success of a growing platform (Bohn and
Kundisch 2018), even if the chosen launch strategy was the
right one. Last but not least, a systematic exploitation of
the increasing number of online posts discussing and also
criticizing certain types of existing platforms (e.g., via
Trustpilot) by means of text mining and sentiment analysis
may provide useful insights regarding the improvement of
already established platforms as well as regarding the user-
centric design of new ones.
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